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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal realism is alive and well among patent lawyers. Patent law-
yers-at least those who regularly practice before the Federal Cir-
cuit-are firmly convinced that the outcome of their case depends on
the panel they draw. They prepare "judge charts" outlining how each
judge has voted on each of the relevant cases. They summarize the
state of the law by "counting noses"-that is, by seeing how many dif-
ferent judges (and which ones) have signed off on a controversial le-
gal doctrine. And they tailor their oral arguments to particular
judges, because they think that who is on the panel matters greatly
to the outcome.'
We recently studied the outcomes of every final written patent
validity decision at both the district court and Federal Circuit levels
between 1989 and 1996.2 The study produced a variety of interesting
statistics on patent validity questions. Using the dataset from that
study, and matching it with the panels serving on each appellate
t 0 2000 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley.
* Spence Centennial Professor of Business Administration, Graduate School of
Business, University of Texas at Austin.
** Professor of Law, Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley; of counsel, Fish
& Richardson P.C.
1. Indeed, the Federal Circuit is sufficiently cognizant of this possibility that the
court refuses to divulge the names of the judges on any given panel until the morning of
oral argument. See Mary L. Jennings, Should Advocates Be Informed of the Identities of
Members of Judicial Panels Prior to Hearings?, 6 FED. CIR. BAR. J. 41 (1996) (noting this
practice); see also Hon. Howard T. Markey, 100 F.R.D. 499, 511-12 (1983) C'It isn't neces-
sary to notify counsel regarding who will be sitting; and it is a little demeaning, frankly...
when lawyers go running around psychoanalyzing judges by reading the tea leaves in their
opinions ahead of time."). In our experience, this may have forced attorneys to prepare and
brief their case more broadly, but it has not prevented them from working feverishly to
match their oral argument to the panel they draw.
2. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Liti-
gated Patents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASSN Q.J. 185 (1998).
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case, we describe in this paper how individual Federal Circuit judges
voted in patent validity cases during that period.
The results may surprise many patent litigators. While there are
some interesting differences in voting patterns, our overall conclu-
sion is that the votes of Federal Circuit judges during this period de-
fied easy description. Judges do not fit easily into "pro-patent" or
"anti-patent" categories, or into "affirmers" and "reversers." We think
this is a good thing for the court system.3 Still, there are some inter-
esting facts to be found in the data.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY
A. Population
The population for this study is described in detail in our prior
study, and we refer the reader there for a full description.4 In brief,
the population we chose for this study includes all written, final pat-
ent validity decisions by the Federal Circuit reported in the U.S.P.Q.
during an almost eight-year period from early 1989 through 1996.
This is a population, not a sample: every opinion is included, whether
or not it was designated "for publication" under the Federal Circuit
rules. However, the population is limited to validity decisions relat-
ing to issued U.S. patents. It does not include infringement decisions,
unenforceability decisions, internal appeals from the PTO, or appeals
from the United States International Trade Commission. Further,
the population is limited to final validity decisions, and does not in-
clude cases that remand the validity issue for further factfinding. Fi-
nally, the measure of our study is by patent, not by case. Thus, if a
judge votes to hold two different patents invalid in a single opinion,
that single opinion counts as two different invalidity findings in our
study.5
3. As one Federal Circuit judge wrote to us after reading our prior study, "I am not
sure whether the article will affect the way I make decisions: in fact, I think it will not, as I
like to think I am neutral when it comes to issues like pro or con patent... ." This strikes
us as an eminently sensible position.
We are also conscious of Judge Wald's caution that "U[Judging is a complex, case-specific,
and subtle taks that defies single-factor analysis; reducing the process to the level of
checking a box on a ballot discredits the responsibility with which federal judges have been
entrusted." Hon. Patricia M. Wald, A Response to iller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 235
(1999). We think our findings are perfectly consistent with this hypothesis, and it is cer-
tainly not our intention to suggest that any judges vote in a mechanical or predictable way.
4. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 194-205.
5. Strictly speaking, the appropriate measure of a decision in a patent case should be
claim by claim. However, as we reported in our earlier study, courts almost never hold one
claim of a patent valid and a second claim of the same patent invalid. See id. at 227-28
(such "claim disaggregation" occurred in only one case during the period 1989 through
1996). Thus, the two measures are essentially equivalent.
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For each of the Federal Circuit decisions in the population, we
have collected a variety of information about the decision. 6 For pur-
poses of this study, we measured several new variables:
We define "participation" in a case as a judge having served
on the panel that produced a decision in our population, and
having either written or signed onto the majority opinion, or
written or signed onto a concurrence or dissent. In most
cases, a single opinion on a single patent involved the par-
ticipation of three judges. However, some cases are decided
by more than three judges (en banc opinions), and some
cases involve the participation of only two Federal Circuit
judges (because the third judge sat by designation from an-
other court).
* We define the writing of an "opinion" regarding the validity
of a patent to include not only majority opinions, but also
concurrences and dissents. For obvious reasons, majority
opinions and dissents are treated differently in determining
whether a particular judge wrote an opinion finding validity
or invalidity. A dissenting vote is normally counted as a vote
opposite the majority opinion (thus, an opinion dissenting
from a finding of validity is considered an opinion in favor of
validity). However, where the dissent is on an unrelated is-
sue, it has not been counted in the total.'
B. Methodology and Limitations
We used two different statistical approaches to evaluate the data
we have collected. Because we have defined a population and in-
cluded all the members of that population in our data set, the normal
tests designed to evaluate the statistical significance of data do not
apply. Within the population, all the numbers we reproduce here are
by definition "statistically significant."s Thus, the majority of the
data we discuss are descriptive statistics about the population, such
as what percentage of patents a particular judge voted to hold invalid
and how many jury verdicts a particular group of judges affirmed.
These descriptive statistics also include data relating one variable to
another, for example, comparing how judges appointed at different
times voted in validity cases. These statistics are interesting for what
they reveal about the population of Federal Circuit validity decisions
6. The complete list of data we evaluated can be found at id. at 198-201.
7. In one case, Judge Newman both wrote the majority opinion as to the validity of a
patent on some issues, and dissented from that opinion. After evaluating the opinions, we
have treated that vote as effectively being a dissent.
8. This is a term of art. Unlike a sample study, all differences found in a population
study are statistically significant. Such differences may nevertheless be small enough for
the reader to consider them practically unimportant.
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during a recent eight-year period. As a matter of statistical inference,
however, they do not predict anything about future cases.
Because we are also interested in the predictive significance of the
data we have collected, we have also evaluated certain questions in
the data set in a second way. This second approach defines our
population as a subset of an indeterminate "superpopulation" con-
sisting of final reported Federal Circuit patent validity decisions
across a range of time. We then apply the techniques of statistical in-
ference to the population to test a number of hypotheses about the
relationship between various factors in the superpopulation. We de-
tail the results in the next Part.
There are of course many limitations and biases inherent in a
study of this type. We describe a number of these in detail in our
prior study.9 Among the most important caveats from that study are
the subject matter bias introduced by excluding appeals from the
PTO, the high rate of affimance resulting from our exclusion of re-
mands from the population, 0 and the presence of multiple causative
facts specific to particular cases which can't effectively be taken into
account in a study of this type." This last point isparticularly impor-
tant. We test the final outcome of the case. Judges may agree on the
final outcome even though they disagree on the reason. Thus, the
coarseness of the data we test here may mask some substantive legal
differences among the judges. 2
An additional bias may result from the nature of the appellate
process. Courts of appeals are more likely to write and publish opin-
ions in cases in which they reverse the district court than in cases in
which they affirm, for the simple reason that at least some affir-
mances can rely heavily on the prior opinion of the district court. To
some extent we control for this bias, since our study includes written
opinions designated "not for publication" as well as published opin-
ions. However, our study does not include one-word or one-paragraph
"summary affirmances" that are not published in U.S.P.Q.13 Because
summary affirmances are more likely than summary reversals,
9. See id. at 202-05.
10. In particular, this may bias the analysis of whether particular judges are likely to
defer to the district court. A judge who was generally unwilling to reverse outright, but
who frequently voted to remand a case for further fact-finding, might appear in the study
to have a high affirmance rate because of the exclusion of remands.
11. On the other hand, one of the biases we noted in the prior study--the exclusion of
unwritten decisions by juries--is not a problem for this study, which focuses only on Fed-
eral Circuit decisions.
12. This is less of a problem than it might be, however, because we also test each of
the grounds for holding a patent valid or invalid. See infra Part III.F.
13. See Fed. Cir. R. 36 (providing for summary affirmances).
[Vol. 27:745
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studying only cases in which an opinion was written may give a
skewed perspective of the actual disposition of cases.
4
Finally, an important new caveat results from the nature of this
study. We are evaluating the results reached by individual judges.
We do not consider it possible or appropriate to define a "superpopu-
lation" of past and future decisions by that particular judge. The de-
cisions of an individual judge can be influenced by a myriad of fac-
tors, either personal or specific to the case at hand. As a result, we
wish to emphasize that we are not attempting to predict how individ.
ual judges will vote in the future. Rather, we offer only descriptive
statistics regarding how those judges have voted in the past. Those
who use our descriptive statistics to predict future decisions do so at
their own risk, and should understand that their projections from
this data do not carry any particular statistical weight.
III. RESULTS
A. Judges in the Population
Twenty-two Federal Circuit judges (active or senior status) par-
ticipated in at least one final patent validity decision during the pe-
riod of our study. 5 As of this writing (October 1999), nine active
judges 6 and five senior judges' 7 in our study remained on the bench.
Some of the judges in our study participated in relatively few cases,
for a variety of reasons: some died or left the bench sometime after
the study began; others were appointed during the period of the
study; still others took senior status and did not have a full docket
during this period. As a result, seven of the judges in the study par-
ticipated in fewer than ten decisions during this period.'" The re-
mainder participated in somewhere between ten and forty-two deci-
sions in our population. Of the twenty-two participating judges,
eighteen wrote at least one opinion included in our study. 9 The me-
14. This problem could also affect the data on patent validity, but only if it were the
case that the Federal Circuit were more likely to summarily affirm district court decisions
of validity than decisions of invalidity.
15. They are: Judges Archer, Baldwin, Bennett, Bissell, Bryson, Clevenger, Cowen,
Friedman, Lourie, Markey, Mayer, Michel, Miller, Newman, Nichols, Nies, Plager, Rader,
Rich, Schall, Skelton, and Smith.
16. They are: Judges Mayer, Newman, Michel, Plager, Lourie, Clevenger, Rader,
Schall and Bryson. Judges Gajarsa, LAnn, and Dyk were appointed to the bench on or after
July 31, 1997, after the ending date of our study, and did not participate in any cases in
our population. Judge Rich died in June 1999, after this study was completed but before it
was published.
17. They are: Judges Cowen, Skelton, Friedman, Smith and Archer. Judge Gibson,
currently senior status, did not participate in any cases in our population.
18. They are: Judges Baldwin (3), Bissell (4), Cowen (8), Miller (2), Nichols (1), Skel-
ton (5) and Smith (8).
19. The judges who did not write an opinion are Judges Cowen, Friedman, Miller, and
Skelton.
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dian number of opinions was fairly low, however. Only six judges
wrote ten or more opinions.20 The full list of participations and opin-
ions is reprinted in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Participation and Authorship of Opinions
Arhe t 7 2U
Baldin 3 2 0 2
Bennet 16 2 0 2
B 4 1 2 3
11 2 0 2
31 8 0 8
8 0 0 0
Fremn 10 0 0 0
L 42 31 0 31
21 11 0 11
y 31 5 1 6
Mihel 38 10 1 11
Mller 2 0 0 0
N 41 20 4 24
1 0 1 1
21 5 0 5
Ilager 20 2 1 3
29 8 2 10
R 23 12 0 12
achal t15 2 0 2
5 0 0 0
[ik 8 1 0 1
20. They are: Judges Lourie (31), Markey (11), Michel (11), Newman (24), Rader (10)
and Rich (12).
[Vol. 27:745
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In addition to analyzing the votes of individual judges, we also de-
fined groups of judges on three different grounds. First, we distin-
guished those judges appointed to the bench before the creation of
the Federal Circuit from those appointed thereafter. Because some
have argued that the Federal Circuit was created to strengthen pat-
ent rights, it is possible to argue that judges appointed to the Federal
Circuit should tend to be more "pro-patent" than judges already on
the bench at the time of its creation. Distinguishing pre-1982 and
post-1982 appointments allows us to evaluate this supposition. When
the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, sitting judges from the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims were
appointed to the new court. Eleven of the twenty-two judges in the
study were appointed to the Federal Circuit in this way, and consti-
tute the group of judges "appointed before 1982."21 The remaining
eleven judges were appointed to the Federal Circuit directly after
1982.22
Second, we defined a group of judges with some patent back-
ground or experience before joining the court, and distinguished
them from judges without any such patent background. Generally
speaking, we defined a judge as having a patent background if they
had regularly practiced patent law, or if they had scientific or techni-
cal expertise. Six of the twenty-two judges in the study had a patent
background; fifteen did not.23 We should emphasize that this division
is made only on the basis of patent law experience prior to joining the
court, not on any expertise developed since that time. One might
21. They are: Judges Baldwin, Bennett, Cowen, Friedman, Markey, Miller, Nichols,
Nies, Rich, Skelton, and Smith.
22. They are: Judges Archer, Bissell, Bryson, Clevenger, Lourie, Mayer, Michel,
Newman, Plager, Rader and Schall.
23. The judges with patent law backgrounds are:
Judge Baldwin, who has a degree in biology and served on the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals from 1968 until 1982;
Judge Lourie, who has an advanced degree in chemistry, was corporate counsel for
SmithKline Beecham, practiced and wrote about patent law before his appointment;
Judge Markey, who has an advanced degree in patent law, practiced patent law before
his appointment, wrote about patent law, and served on the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals from 1972 until 1982;
Judge Newman, who has an advanced degree in chemistry, was a research chemist and a
patent lawyer before her appointment;
Judge Rader, who was counsel to the Senate subcommittee on patents, copyrights and
trademarks, and has written on patent law; and
Judge Rich, who helped draft the 1952 Patent Act, taught and practiced patent law, and
served on the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals from 1956 until 1982.
We based this information on our review of judicial biographies in 2 ALMANAC OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY Fed. Cir. 1-15 (1999); MARIE T. HOUGH ET AL., THE AMERICAN BENCH:
JUDGES OF THE NATION (5th ed. 1989/1990); and our conversations with former law clerks
to the judges.
We did not include Judge Nies in this group, because while she had prior intellectual
property experience, it was apparently not patent-related.
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plausibly argue that judges with a patent background will approach
patent cases differently than those without such a background.
Finally, we divided judges into two groups based on the political
party of the president that appointed them. We have labeled these
groups "Republican" and "Democrat," though we emphasize that it is
the President's party affiliation, and not necessarily the judge's, that
is recorded. This division reveals that the Federal Circuit was an
overwhelmingly Republican court during the period of our study.
Fourteen of the twenty-two judges were appointed by Republican
presidents 24 and eight by Democratic presidents. 5 Six of the eight
Democratic judges, however, were on senior status during the entire
period of the study. Of the remaining two, one (Judge Nies) died
shortly after the study period ended, and the other (Judge Bryson)
was appointed only near the end of the period studied. 26 As a result,
Republican-appointed judges accounted for 349 out of 416 participa-
tions in the study (83.9%) and wrote 132 out of 143 opinions
(92.3%).27
B. Patent Law Specialization
One of the most striking findings about Federal Circuit decisions
in validity cases is the apparent specialization of the court. A rela-
tively small number of judges have taken responsibility for writing a
large proportion of the patent opinions the court produces.
Our study includes 416 "participations" and 143 opinions alto-
gether. Participation in a patent case is presumably random, deter-
mined on the basis of which judges happen to be assigned to a panel.
But by measuring the number of patent validity opinions a judge
writes, we can get a sense of that judge's level of involvement in pat-
ent law.
Judges appointed before 1982 wrote about the same percentage of
opinions as judges appointed after 1982. Judges appointed before
1982 accounted for 118 out of 416 participations in the study (28.4%),
and for 34 out of 143 opinions (23.8%)-slightly less than would be
predicted by chance. By contrast, judges who had patent experience
24. They are: Judges Archer, Bennett, Bissell, Clevenger, Lourie, Markey, Mayer, Mi-
chel, Miller, Newman, Plager, Rader, Rich, and SchalL
25. They are: Judges Baldwin, Bryson, Cowen, Friedman, Nichols, Nies, Skelton, and
Smith.
26. President Clinton has appointed three additional active judges since this study
ended (Judges Gajarsa, Linn and Dyk).
27. Because the court is so heavily Republican, we have not attempted the sort of par-
tisan analysis of decisions that Tiller and Cross have done elsewhere. See, e.g., Frank B.
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whis.
tleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998). In any event, we
suspect that determinations of patent validity are not often ones that stir the partisan
spirit. Cf. Wald, supra note 3, at 237 ("A large proportion of [D.C. Circuit] cases have no
apparent ideology to support or reject at all.").
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before joining the court accounted for only 159 out of 416 participa-
tions (38.2%), but wrote 90 out of 143 opinions (62.9%). This fact
strongly suggests that judges with patent experience are more likely
to be assigned to write the majority opinion. 8 The data are presented
in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Participation and Authorship of Opinions
298 96 13 109
L59 84 6 90
Z57 45 8 53
This pattern continues when one looks at individual judges on the
court. A few judges seem to write opinions in a disproportionate
number of cases. Among patent-experienced judges, for example,
Judge Lourie wrote opinions in 31 out of the 42 cases in which he
participated (73.8%). Judge Markey wrote 11 opinions in 21 cases
(52.4%), Judge Newman wrote 24 opinions in 41 cases (58.5%), and
Judge Rich wrote 12 opinions in 23 cases (52.2%). By contrast, Judge
Plager wrote only 3 opinions in 20 cases (15.0%), Judge Schall wrote
2 opinions in 15 cases (13.3%), and Judge Mayer wrote 6 opinions in
31 cases (19.4%).
The result is that-at least if we measure influence by opinions2 9
-a relatively small number of judges have a significant influence on
the course of patent validity law. Judge Lourie and Judge Newman
between them wrote 55 out of the 143 opinions in the study (38.5%);
just five judges (Judges Lourie, Newman, Rich, Michel and Markey)
wrote 89 out of the 143 opinions (62.2%).
C. Validity
One of the most common assumptions among patent lawyers is
that different judges have different inclinations to uphold the valid-
ity of a patent. We tested the groups we identified, as well as indi-
28. While some of this difference could perhaps be explained by the greater interest of
such judges in writing concurrences and dissents, the numbers are even more striking if
one counts only majority opinions. Judges with patent experience wrote 89 out of 129 ma-
jority opinions (69.0%).
29. On opinion-writing as a measure of judicial influence, see William M. Landes,
Lawrence Lessig, & Michael Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal
Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998).
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vidual judges, to see whether their validity votes differed signifi-
cantly.
Among the groups we identified, validity votes were remarkably
consistent. Judges appointed before 1982 voted to hold a patent valid
62 times out of 118, or 52.5% of the time. Judges appointed after
1982 voted to hold a patent valid 164 times out of 298, or 55.0% of
the time. While judges appointed to the Federal Circuit, with its
widely asserted pro-patent orientation,30 did vote slightly more often
to uphold the validity of a patent than their predecessors, the num-
bers are quite similar. The Federal Circuit did hold patents valid
much more often than its predecessor courts,3 1 but the difference
cannot be attributed to judges appointed to that court at different
times.
Nor is there a significant difference in the voting patterns of
judges with and without patent experience. Judges with prior patent
experience voted to uphold the validity of the patent 92 times out of
159, or 57.9% of the time, while judges without patent experience
voted to hold a patent valid only 134 times out of 257, or 52.1% of the
time. While judges with patent experience were somewhat more
likely to find a patent valid than judges without such experience, the
difference is not major. It certainly doesn't appear to justify any ro-
bust conclusions on the role of patent expertise in influencing out-
comes.
In the superpopulation, we tested two hypotheses relating to
group validity voting patterns:
Hypothesis 1. There is no difference in the likelihood that judges
appointed before 1982 and judges appointed after 1982 will vote to
hold a patent valid rather than invalid.
We used the Chi-square test, and the p-value for hypothesis 1 was
0.621, indicating that we could not reject this hypothesis and there-
fore could not confidently predict that year of appointment influenced
validity voting.2
30. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Special-
ized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Donald R. Dunner, The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit: Its First Three Years, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1985); Robert P.
Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation,
76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 822 (1988).
31. Our prior study found that patents were held valid in the courts 54% of the time.
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 205. Decisions by the Federal Circuit upheld validity
approximately 52% of the time. See id. at 241, Table 15 (counting affirmances and rever-
sals of trial court validity and invalidity decisions). By contrast, prior studies showed only
about a 35% validity rate. See GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 4-18 to 4-19, 4-22 to 4-23 (rev. ed. 1980).
32. A hypothesis can be rejected with 95% confidence if the p-value is less than 0.05,
and with 90% confidence if the p-value is less than 0.1. P-values greater than 0.1 indicate
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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Hypothesis 2. There is no difference in the likelihood that judges
with a patent law background and judges without such a back-
ground will vote to hold a patent valid rather than invalid.
The p-value for hypothesis 2 was 0.466, indicating that we could
not reject this hypothesis and therefore could not confidently predict
that patent law experience influenced validity voting.
We also investigated the voting patterns of individual judges.
Here, too, it was very difficult to categorize judges as either "pro" or
"anti"-patent. Of the fourteen judges who participated in more than
10 validity decisions, the majority came quite close to the average
validity participation rate of 54.3%.13 [The complete votes and per-
centages are detailed in Table 3]. There were only a few outliers. On
the side of invalidity, Judge Mayer voted to hold a patent valid in
only 12 cases out of thirty-one, or 38.7%, and Judge Markey voted to
hold a patent valid in only nine cases out of twenty-one, or 42.9%. On
the side of validity, Judge Newman voted to hold a patent valid in
thirty-one cases out of forty-one, or 75.6%, Judge Plager voted to hold
a patent valid in fourteen cases out of twenty, or 70.0%, and Judge
Rader voted to hold a patent valid in nineteen cases out of twenty-
nine, or 65.5%. Even these outliers don't seem to support the charac-
terization of the judges involved as necessarily "pro" or "anti"-patent,
particularly given the small number of cases for each judge. Rather,
the numbers suggest to us that a judge's opinions about patent va-
lidity are complex and case-specific and are not prone to generaliza-
tion.
We tested the following hypothesis in the superpopulation:
Hypothesis 3. There is no difference in the likelihood that Judges
Archer, Baldwin, Bennett, Bissell, Bryson, Clevenger, Cowen,
Friedman, Lourie, Markey, Mayer, Michel, Miller, Newman, Nich-
ols, Nies, Plager, Rader, Rich, Schall, Skelton, or Smith will vote to
hold that a patent is valid rather than invalid.
The p-value for hypothesis 3 was 0.404, indicating that we could
not reject this hypothesis and therefore could not confidently predict
that individual judges vote differently in validity cases.
33. This rate differs slightly from the overall decision rate identified in the first study
because we are measuring participations, not cases, as the denominator. The ratios may
differ because some decisions included a dissent, because some cases were decided en banc,
and because some cases were decided with the participation of only two Federal Circuit
judges.
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TABLE 3
Votes on Validity
U
3
0
4 2 50.0
11 6 54.5
31 16 51.6
8 5 62.5
10 7 70.0
42 21 50.0
21 9 42.9
31 12 38.7
38 18 47.4
2 1 50.0
41 31 75.6
1 1 100.0
21 11 52.4
20 14 70.0
29 19 65.5
23 11 47.8
15 7 46.7
5 4 80.0
Q A F~rAA
A similar story can generally be told of the opinions written by in-
dividual judges, although there is a curious exception. Of the six
judges who wrote ten or more opinions on patent validity in our
study, four wrote opinions on both sides with roughly equal fre-
quency. [The complete statistics for each judge can be found in Table
4]. But two judges were outliers in opinion writing: Judge Markey,
only three of whose eleven opinions upheld the validity of a patent
(27.3%), and Judge Newman, who wrote twenty-four opinions, all
twenty-four upholding the validity of a patent (100.0%). What is no-
table about these judges is not only that they are outside the norm,
1i -
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but that their written opinions were more skewed towards one out-
come than their overall voting patterns.
We tested the following hypothesis in the superpopulation:
Hypothesis 4. There is no difference in the likelihood that the Fed-
eral Circuit will find a patent valid rather than invalid when
Judges Archer, Baldwin, Bennett, Bissell, Bryson, Clevinger,
Lourie, Markey, Mayer, Michel, Newman, Nies, Plager, Rader,
Rich, Schall, or Smith writes the court's majority opinion.
The p-value for hypothesis 4 was 0.001, indicating that the hypothe-
sis was rejected with great confidence. We can therefore predict that
who writes the majority opinion is related to whether the court finds
the patent valid.14
Despite a small number of judges with patterns that deviate from
the norm, the pattern we discern in Federal Circuit judges' votes as
to validity is not one of a court divided on broad questions of valid-
ity.35 Rather, the overwhelming majority of judges show no leaning
whatsoever for or against the validity of the patent. And those few
judges who did tend to vote one way or the other for the most part
showed only a modest tendency in that direction.
TABLE 4
Opinions on Validity
2 0 0.0
2 2 100.0
3 2 66.7
2 2 100.0
B 3 37.5
0 0 0.0
0 0
31 15 48.4
11 3 27.3
6 1 16.7
34. What the hypothesis does not tell us is the precise nature of that relationship.
One obvious explanation is that some judges are more likely than others to write opinions
upholding the validity of the patent. However, analysis of judicial opinion patterns is com-
plicated by the fact that the panel assigns a majority opinion to a particular judge after the
panel as a whole has decided the outcome of the case. As a result, an alternative explana-
tion is that certain judges are more likely to be assigned opinions in cases in which the
panel has decided to hold a patent valid.
35. It does not, of course, mean that the Federal Circuit is not divided on particular
questions of patent law.
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11 6 54.5
0
24 24 100.0
1 1 100.0
5 3 60.0
3 2 66.7
10 4 40.0
12 7 58.3
2 0 0.0
0 10_ _ _ _ _
II Inn
D. Affirmance
We also tested the tendency of various judges and groups of judges
to affirm the decision of the finder of fact. In our first study, we found
an overwhelmingly high Federal Circuit affirmance rate: 86.3% of
the district court decisions were affirmed, at least in part, while only
17.1% were reversed at least in part."6 This high affirmance rate is
an artifact of the population we have chosen, which excludes cases
that are remanded for further proceedings, and therefore includes
only outright reversals in the reversal statistics. For ease of compari-
son, we have measured the affirmance rates for individual judges
and groups of judges against the benchmark participation rate of
83.6% affirmedY.3
Judges appointed before 1982, and those without patent experi-
ence, were slightly more likely to vote to affirm the district court
than their opposite numbers. Judges appointed before 1982 voted to
affirm in 103 cases out of 118, or 87.3%, while judges appointed after
1982 voted to affirm in 245 cases out of 298, or 82.2%. Judges with
prior patent experience voted to affirm in 127 cases out of 159, or
36. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 240 & Table 14. These numbers total more
than 100% because in some cases the Federal Circuit both affirmed and reversed the dis-
trict court on different validity issues.
37. This rate differs slightly from the overall affirmance rate identified in the first
study because we are measuring participations, not cases, as the denominator. The ratios
may differ because some decisions included a dissent, because some cases were decided en
banc, and because some cases were decided with the participation of only two Federal Cir-
cuit judges.
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79.9%, while judges without prior patent experience voted to affirm
in 221 cases out of 257, or 86.0%.
We tested the following hypotheses in the superpopulation:
Hypothesis 5. There is no difference in the likelihood that judges
appointed before 1982 and judges appointed after 1982 will vote to
affirm the district court.
The p-value for hypothesis 5 was 0.363, indicating that we could not
reject this hypothesis and therefore could not confidently predict that
year of appointment influenced the likelihood of affirmance.
Hypothesis 6. There is no difference in the likelihood that judges
with a patent law background and judges without such a back-
ground will vote to affirm the district court.
The p-value for hypothesis 6 was 0.165. This indicates that we could
not reject this hypothesis, and therefore cannot condfidently predict
that judges with patent law background are less likely to affirm the
district court.
One can construct a plausible rationale for the modest differences
that do exist in the numbers. Judges appointed to a patent-specific
court, or judges with a patent background, may be more willing to
substitute their judgment for that of the district court. What is
striking to us, though, is not the differences but the similarities in af-
firmance rate. As with validity, it appears that what differences do
exist in the deference groups of judges give to district courts are not
major, at least when it comes down to the final decision to affirm or
reverse.
That same pattern holds for the voting records of individual
judges. Of the fourteen judges who voted in more than 10 cases, a
majority of them were quite close to the overall affirmance participa-
tion rate of 83.6%. [The complete votes and percentages are detailed
in Table 5]. There were only a few outliers. On the high affirmance
side, Judge Markey voted to affirm in twenty out of twenty-one cases,
or 95.2%; Judge Bennett voted to affirm in fifteen out of sixteen
cases, or 93.8%; Judge Clevenger voted to affirm in twenty-nine out
of thirty-one cases, or 93.6%, and Judge Mayer voted to affirm in
twenty-eight out of thirty-one cases, or 90.3%. On the low affirmance
side, Judge Newman voted to affirm in only thirty out of forty-one
cases, or 73.2%. As with the validity votes, these outliers are notable
for how close they are to the norm, suggesting that one cannot sim-
plistically characterize particular judges as favoring or opposing def-
erence to the finder of fact.
We tested the following hypothesis in the superpopulation:
Hypothesis 7. There is no difference in the likelihood that Judges
Archer, Baldwin, Bennett, Bissell, Bryson, Clevenger, Cowen,
Friedman, Lourie, Markey, Mayer, Michel, Miller, Newman, Nich-
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ols, Nies, Plager, Rader, Rich, Schall, Skelton, or Smith will vote to
affirm the district court.
The p-value for hypothesis 7 was 0.069. This indicates that the
hypothesis can be rejected with 90% confidence, though not with 95%
confidence. In other words, we can weakly predict that individual
judges vary significantly in the likelihood that they will vote to af-
firm the district court.
TABLE 5
Votes on Affirmance
3 100.0
3 15 93.8
2 50.0
1 9 81.8
1 29 93.5
8 100.0
D 10 100.0
2 33 78.6
1 20 95.2
1 28 90.3
8 32 84.2
2 100.0
1 30 73.2
0 0.0
1 17 81.0
0 16 80.0
9 23 79.3
3 18 78.3
5 !13 86.7
A similar story can generally be told of the opinions written by in-
dividual judges, although as with validity there is a curious pattern.
Of the six judges who wrote ten or more opinions on patent validity
in our study, three wrote opinions affirming with a frequency close to
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the norm. [The complete statistics for each judge can be found in Ta-
ble 61. But three judges were outliers in opinion writing: Judge
Markey, all eleven of whose opinions affirmed the district court
(100.0%), Judge Rich, only nine of whose twelve opinions affirmed
the district court (75%), and Judge Newman, only fourteen of whose
twenty-four opinions affirmed the district court (58.3%). What is no-
table about these judges is not only that they are well outside the
norm, but that (as with validity decisions) their written opinions
were more skewed away from the norm than their overall voting pat-
terns.8
We tested the following hypothesis in the superpopulation:
Hypothesis 8. There is no difference in the likelihood that the Fed-
eral Circuit will affirm the district court when Judges Archer,
Baldwin, Bennett, Bissell, Bryson, Clevinger, Lourie, Markey,
Mayer, Michel, Newman, Nies, Plager, Rader, Rich, Schall, or
Smith writes the court's majority opinion.
The p-value for hypothesis 8 was 0.249, indicating that we could
not reject this hypothesis-and therefore could not confidently pre-
dict that the court would vote differently in affirming or reversing
the district court when different judges wrote the majority opinion.3 9
Despite the fact that a few judges deviated from the norm, the
pattern we discern in Federal Circuit judges' decisions to affirm or
reverse is not one of a court divided on the question of the general
deference to give to the district court. Rather, the overwhelming ma-
jority of judges are rather close to each other in their affirmance
rates. And those few judges who did tend to vote one way or the other
generally showed only a modest tendency in that direction.
38. It is also worth noting that two of the Judges who were outliers in opposite direc-
tions on validity opinions (Judges Markey and Newman) were also outliers on affirmance
opinions.
39. As noted previously, decisions on who writes a majority opinion are generally
made after the outcome of the case has been decided. The caveat about causation raised in
that footnote is also applicable here.
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TABLE 6
Opinions on Affirmance
2 2 100.0
1 1 50.0
3 1 33.3
2 2 100.0
3 8 100.0
0
31 27 87.1
11 11 100.0
6 3 50.0
11 10 90.9
Z4 14 58.3
1 0 0.0
5 3 60.0
3 3 100.0
10 8 80.0
12 9 175.0
2 2 100.0
1 1 l nfl 
E. Finder of Fact
As a subset of affirmance decisions, we also tested whether groups
of judges were more likely to affirm the findings of juries or judges.
We defined three groups of "finders of fact": juries, judges ruling after
a bench trial, and judges ruling on pretrial motions.40 We found very
few differences between judges appointed before 1982 and those ap-
pointed after 1982 in how they dealt with different finders of fact. As
40. In one instance, the ruling was also made on a JMOL motion. We have excluded
this patent from this calculation.
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previously noted, judges appointed before 1982 were somewhat more
likely to affirm than judges appointed after 1982. But that modest
difference-a spread of about 4 percentage points-was consistent
across all finders of fact. [A complete listing of how groups of judges
voted can be found in Table 7 below].
TABLE 7
Votes on Affirmance by Finder of Fact
.2 36 85.7 5b 01 UL.I
.7 72 82.8 127 111 87.4
.1 40 78.4 72 64 88.9
'8 68 87.2 111 98 88.3
Judges with patent experience, by contrast, differed notably from
their counterparts in how they responded to finders of fact. Judges
with patent experience were less likely to defer to a jury finding.
They affirmed in 40 out of 51 jury votes (78.4%), compared with 68
out of 78 votes (87.2%) for judges without patent experience. The dif-
ferences are even greater with respect to pretrial motions. Judges
with patent experience voted to affirm a pretrial ruling in 22 out of
32 cases (68.8%), while judges without patent experience voted to af-
firm a pretrial ruling in 51 out of 60 cases (85.0%). This result might
be intuitive-judges with greater expertise in an area may simply be
less likely to defer to a decision within their area of expertise that
they think is wrong. Curiously, however, no similar relationship can
be found for bench trials. In fact, judges with patent experience were
almost exactly as likely to affirm a bench trial ruling than judges
without patent experience: they voted to do so 64 out of 72 times
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(88.9%), compared with 98 out of 111 times (88.3%) for judges with-
out patent experience."
These findings are weakly consistent with the hypothesis that
judges with patent experience are more likely to second-guess the
finders of fact. But it is difficult to explain why they would be willing
to do so in reviewing jury trials and in pretrial motions, but not in
reviewing bench trials. Further, the differences are simply not that
great.
F. Specific Arguments
In our first study, we evaluated a number of different specific
grounds asserted for holding a patent invalid. We have also tested
how groups of judges voted on specific issues of patent law. The full
results are available from the Authors; here we wish to cal out only
a few results.
There is a modest difference in how judges with and without pat-
ent experience treated issues of best mode.42 Judges with patent ex-
perience voted to reject best mode arguments (and hold the patent
valid on this ground) 20 times out of 27, or 74.1%; judges without
patent experience voted to reject best mode arguments only 24 times
out of 39, or 61.5%. This difference, while modest, might be read to
suggest that judges with patent experience have a greater tolerance
for errors in disclosure. However, the number of cases is not great,
and the difference in results is also modest.
There is a dramatic difference in how judges appointed before and
after 1982 dealt with the category of 102 prior art cases.4 Judges ap-
pointed before 1982 rejected section 102 prior art arguments (and
therefore upheld the validity of the patent on this ground) 20 times
out of 23 (87.0%). By contrast, judges appointed after 1982 rejected
section 102 prior art arguments only 39 times out of 78 (50.0%). This
strikes us as an anomalous result. We see no obvious reason for such
a striking difference.
Finally, there were modest differences among both groups in the
treatment of obviousness. Judges appointed before 1982 voted to re-
ject obviousness arguments (and therefore to uphold the validity of
the patent on this ground) 31 times out of 61 (50.8%), while judges
appointed after 1982 rejected obviousness arguments 93 times out of
41. While we identified the numbers for individual judges as well, the number of par-
ticipations in each category are sufficiently small that we are reluctant to point out any dif-
ferences.
42. Section 112, 1 1 of the Patent Act requires the patentee to disclose the "best mode"
of practicing the invention of which she is aware. These cases involve an argument that a
patentee failed to do so.
43. This refers to cases involving anticipation of the invention by a prior art reference
disclosing the same invention. We have distinguished 102 Prior Art from cases involving
102 Non-Art, such as statutory bars under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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140 (66.4%). Judges with patent experience voted to reject obvious-
ness arguments 49 times out of 72 (68.1%), while judges without pat-
ent experience rejected obviousness arguments 75 times out of 129
(58.1%). The fact that judges appointed after 1982 and judges with
patent experience were more likely to hold a patent valid over an ob-
viousness argument may be consistent with the conventional wisdom
that one of the purposes of creating the Federal Circuit was to reduce
obviousness rejections in the courts of appeals." Again, however, the
differences are not dramatic.
As a check on the importance of these findings, we also collected
information on total decisions by each group for two aggregate cate-
gories, entitled 'Total 112" (all enablement, written description, in-
definiteness, and best mode cases) and 'Total 102/103" (all 102 art,
102 non-art, and obviousness cases) respectively. In these broad
categories, there is remarkable agreement between each of the major
groups tested-to within two percentage points in the case of 102/103
decisions, and within a few percentage points in the case of 112 deci-
sions. This aggregate result reinforces our suspicion that the results
reported for specific types of arguments are not particularly compel-
ling.
IV. CONCLUSION
The high degree of convergence we observe in the voting patterns
of Federal Circuit judges may be surprising to some. The Federal
Circuit has come under a good deal of fire as a politically divided
court that issues inconsistent opinions." Several high-profile dis-
agreements have helped bolster this impression." But at least on
questions of patent validity, we see little evidence of ideological divi-
sions affecting the final outcome of cases. With a very few exceptions,
judges on the Federal Circuit varied little in their votes on validity
issues, and in the outcomes they reached. This may be a surprise to
some who are practiced at predicting how individual judges are pre-
44. To be fair, the complaints about obviousness decisions in the courts of appeals be-
fore 1982 were generally directed to the regional circuits deciding the validity of issued
patents, not to the decisions of the CCPA. Still, the fact that one perceived goal of the Fed-
eral Circuit was to strengthen patent rights might be thought to create an incentive on the
part of newer judges to favor the patentee in doubtful cases.
45. See, e.g., Matthew F. Wedl & William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis: The Some-
times Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-Making, 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFC. SOCY 791, 793-94 (1998); Allan N. Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our
Patent System, 37 IDEA 545, 552 (1997).
46. See, e.g., Hilton-Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc); Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
ban); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en bane); In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (reaching a conclusion inconsistent with Alappat without noting the con-
flict), vacated, 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also Weil & Rooklidge. supra note
45 (identifying a number of unresolved intra-circuit conflicts).
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disposed to vote. But we think it an encouraging sign that the out-
come of patent validity cases in the Federal Circuit has depended on
the facts of the case, and not on the composition of the panel.
